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We study the impact of shareholder-initiated litigation risk on a firm's stock price crash risk. 
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of the staggered adoption of universal demand laws, 
which led to an exogenous decline in derivative litigation risk. We find that a decline in the 
threat of derivative litigation reduces crash risk and that information hoarding associated with 
earnings management is a channel through which litigation risk affects crash risk. The 
relationship is also moderated by how exposed firms are to the other primary form of 
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Corporate governance mechanisms help protect shareholder interests within a firm 
(Jensen, 1993). One important component of this is the legal protection afforded to 
shareholders, which reduces agency problems resulting from misalignments in the interests of 
shareholders and managers (La Porta et al., 1998; Cheng et al., 2010). Litigation rights provide 
a disciplinary tool for shareholders to influence the behavior of management.  This right has 
been shown to reduce managerial misconduct (Romano, 1991), strengthen the position of the 
board of directors (Ferris et al., 2007), discourage excessive risk-taking (Ferris et al., 2007; 
Gormley and Matsa, 2016), and affect the cost of debt (Ni and Yin, 2018) and the value of 
corporate cash holdings (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
Prior studies also find that litigation risk affects a firm’s disclosure environment. 
Bourveau et al. (2018) find that the threat of derivative lawsuits can discourage corporate 
disclosure. As litigation risk and the associated costs are reduced, firms become more willing 
to disclose further information. Better corporate disclosure should also reduce the impetus for 
management to hoard bad news, subsequently leading to a decline in the number of negative 
stock price shocks that a firm experiences. Because bad news hoarding is generally considered 
the main cause of stock price crash risk (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 
2011a, b), we expect that a reduction in derivative litigation risk results in a decline in stock 
price crash risk (hereafter, crash risk).  
There is, however, evidence showing that when faced with litigation risk, managers 
voluntarily disclose bad news pre-emptively to deter lawsuits (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 
1995; Johnson, et al., 2001). Therefore, a competing hypothesis is that a decrease in litigation 
risk reduces disclosure quality and ultimately increases crash risk. As a result, it is unclear 
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which direction the association between litigation risk and crash risk will, on average, 
dominate.  
We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining this issue empirically. To do 
so, we first consider two important issues. The first issue is the type of lawsuit being examined. 
There are two primary types of legal recourse available to shareholders: derivative lawsuits 
(hereafter, DLs) and direct-action lawsuits such as securities lawsuits. DLs are filed by 
shareholders on behalf of a corporation against corporate insiders (Kinney, 1994). They 
primarily deal with breaches of fiduciary duties by the firm's directors and/or officers. The 
settlement generally involves changes in the firm's corporate governance practices (Erickson, 
2010; Ferris et al., 2007). Any monetary recovery, which is uncommon, goes to the corporate 
treasury, not to the shareholders. On the other hand, securities class action lawsuits are filed 
directly by shareholders as plaintiffs. They allege securities fraud and direct harm to the 
shareholders. These lawsuits tend to be cash-settled.  
This paper focuses on DLs because they are the primary legal tool to force corporate 
governance change within a firm and therefore constitute an important corporate governance 
mechanism (Erickson, 2010; Ferris et al., 2007). Nevertheless, securities class action suits are 
also relevant. In fact, these two types of lawsuits sometimes behave as substitutes and 
sometimes as complements. Choi et al. (2017) find that DLs tend to usually follow security 
class action suits. For example, a firm that has committed securities fraud may also implicate 
directors and officers for breaching their fiduciary duties, thus spurring a need for internal 
corporate governance reforms. If one form of lawsuit is too difficult to file, shareholders may 
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decide to pursue the alternative. As a result, to fully understand the effect of litigation risk on 
crashes, we need to consider alternative ways in which shareholders can pursue litigation.1 
Endogeneity is the second important empirical issue that we consider and address 
substantially in this study. For instance, shareholder litigation risk and crash risk may be 
simultaneously affected by one or more omitted variable(s). Moreover, shareholders likely 
consider future crash risks when deciding whether to initiate a lawsuit. These possibilities add 
to the challenge of establishing a causal effect of litigation risk on crashes and require an 
identification strategy that utilizes an exogenous variation in the firm-level litigation risk. To 
address this issue, we follow prior studies and use the U.S. states’ staggered adoption of 
universal demand (UD) laws, which significantly increased the difficulty of filing DLs against 
corporate insiders (Bourveau et al., 2018; Ni and Ying, 2018; Nguyen, et al., 2018). UD laws 
are based on a firm’s state of incorporation and have been adopted by 23 U.S. states so far. UD 
laws effectively reduce the ability of shareholders to push through a derivative lawsuit as they 
first require that the shareholders make a demand to the firm's board of directors to take actions 
against the alleged wrongdoer(s). Boards usually reject shareholders’ demands, often due to a 
conflict of interest because in many cases, individual directors are named in the lawsuit. The 
adoption of the UD laws, which took place in different states in different years, provides a 
plausibly exogenous shock to the threat of DLs faced by a firm’s officers and directors. This 
allows us to establish the causal effect of litigation risk on a firm’s crash risk. 
Our sample consists of 38,471 firm-year observations of publicly traded companies 
incorporated in the U.S. from the year 1993 to 2014. We proxy firm-specific stock price crash 
risk using three measures common in the literature: the negative skewness coefficient of firm-
                                                            
1 There is also evidence to suggest that the threat of securities class action lawsuits tends to result in firms 
voluntarily disclosing more information as a pre-emptive measure to avoid this type of litigation (Dong and Zhang, 
2019; Houston, et al., 2019).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3832156
4 
 
specific returns (NSKEW), the down-to-up volatility of firm-specific returns (DUVOL), and a 
count (COUNT) of the difference in the number of days with negative, as opposed to positive, 
extreme firm-specific returns (Chen et al., 2001; Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009).  
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach following prior research (Bourveau 
et al., 2018; Ni and Ying, 2018; Nguyen, et al., 2018). Our treatment group is comprised of 
firms incorporated in states that have adopted UD laws. Our results show a significant reduction 
in crash risk among firms incorporated in states that have adopted UD laws. These results hold 
even when we include a comprehensive set of firm-level control variables and year and firm 
fixed-effects. These results are also economically significant. The adoption of UD laws leads 
to a reduction in crash risk by at least 14% of the respective measure’s standard deviation.  
Next, we conduct several tests to address potential measurement error concerns. We 
check for pre-trend, i.e. whether crash risk starts to diminish even before a state adopts a UD 
law. We find no evidence of such a pre-existing trend. Crash risk starts to decline the years 
after a state adopts UD laws. We also conduct a placebo test to ensure that other unobservable 
state-level events do not drive our results. In this test, we randomize the state a firm is 
incorporated in, re-run our baseline regression and repeat the process 1,000 times. The results 
show no evidence that our baseline results can be generated by a random draw. We also conduct 
a test to ensure that our results are not driven by specific state-based corporate laws – 
specifically those considered in Karpoff and Wittry (2018) – that are known to affect the market 
for corporate control. These laws do not affect our baseline results. 
We also examine the role that the risk of securities class action lawsuits can have in 
moderating the relationship between derivative litigation risk and crash risk. We use two 
proxies for the risk of firms facing securities lawsuits. The first is the intensity of actual lawsuits 
on a state-year basis, and the second is based on the work of Huang et al. (2019) who measure 
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ex-ante securities class action risk using a measure of the political ideology of the federal circuit 
courts. Results from both approaches show that UD laws are more important among firms 
which have access to fewer legal remedies to protect shareholders.2  
Finally, we examine whether the improvement in corporate opacity due to the adoption 
of UD laws is a channel by which stock price crash risk is reduced. Using structural equation 
modelling, we show that the substantive impact UD laws have on crash risk is through a change 
in a firm’s earnings management. Moreover, we adopt Andreou et al. (2017)’s methodology to 
analyse breaks in a firm’s positive earnings streak and find that, after UD laws, there are fewer 
stock price crashes that coincide with negative earnings announcements after a string of 
positive earnings news. This result suggests that there is a significant reduction in bad news 
hoarding to mask unfavourable earnings after the adoption of UD laws.   
We conduct a battery of robustness tests on our main results. To address selection bias, 
we use the propensity score matching (PSM) approach. Further, to address the sensitivity of 
our results to the use of varying statistical specifications, we use firm fixed effects and state 
headquarters-by-year fixed effects as well as the generalized methods of moments estimator 
instead of panel OLS. Moreover, we conduct additional tests that control for state citizen 
ideology and state government ideology (Berry et al., 1998), corporate governance, the effect 
of the ninth circuit states, Delaware incorporation, corporate lobbying, and periods of financial 
stress. All these robustness tests continue to support our baseline results of the effect of UD 
laws have on crash risk.  
                                                            
2 We also examine whether using Kim and Skinner's (2012) model for estimating a firm's ex-ante securities 
litigation risk moderates the impact that UD laws have on crash risk. While the results of applying their measure 
of firm ex-ante litigation risk reveals it is significant and positively associated with crash risk, it does not 
significantly influence the impact that UD laws have on crash risk. This latter result may be due to the fact that 
some of the variables used in the model to predict class action lawsuits also affect derivative lawsuits. For this 
reason, we rely on actual, rather than predicted, class action lawsuits for cleaner inference. 
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This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, by exploiting plausible 
exogenous variations in derivative litigation risk, we show that it directly affects a firm's stock 
price crash risk. While litigation risk has been shown to affect corporate behavior (Ferris et al., 
2007; Gormley and Matsa, 2016), the cost of debt (Ni and Yin, 2018), the cost of bank loans 
(Chu, 2017) and the value of corporate cash holdings (Nguyen, et al., 2018), we show that it 
can also have a direct impact on a firm's market value. We, therefore, further emphasize the 
significant role that litigation risk has in shaping the corporate environment.  
We also contribute to the derivative lawsuit litigation literature by showing the 
ramification that changes in corporate disclosure activities (Bourveau et al., 2018) caused by 
UD laws have on the stock market. In addition, we shed light on the interlinkages between 
different forms of shareholder litigation. Specifically, we find that the impact of UD laws on 
crash risk is moderated by how exposed firms are to the other main form of shareholder 
litigation, namely securities class action lawsuits.  
Furthermore, we contribute to the stock price crash risk literature by discovering 
another important cause of such crashes. Prior research has shown that crash risk is linked to 
several corporate governance factors, including corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011a), 
executive personal compensation sensitivity (Kim et al., 2011b), managerial career concerns 
(Andreou et al., 2016), CEO overconfidence (Kim et al., 2016), accounting conservatism (Kim 
and Zhang, 2016), auditor-client relationships (Callen and Fang, 2017), and 10-K report 
readability (Kim et al., 2019). We show that a key mechanism of corporate governance, through 
shareholder litigation (La Porta et al., 1998; Cheng et al., 2010), is also directly linked to crash 
risk due to its impact on a firm’s disclosure regime. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used 
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to assess the relation between stock price crash risk and universal demand laws. Section 4 
presents our empirical analysis, while section 5 concludes the paper and presents avenues for 
future research. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Derivative lawsuits are an important mechanism that shareholders can use to force 
directors and officers to fulfil their fiduciary duties. In particular, Erickson (2010) notes that as 
the evidential hurdles required to file securities class action lawsuits have risen since the 1995 
Private Securities Litigation Reform, many shareholders opted for DLs instead. In derivative 
lawsuits, as the name implies, the shareholders who launch the lawsuit are the derivative 
plaintiff, with the firm itself being the plaintiff. The defendants tend to be the managers and/or 
directors who have allegedly failed to fulfil their fiduciary duties. Therefore, while a successful 
DL may lead to individual managers having to compensate the firm for damages, it is more 
common that settlements include corporate governance reforms as a means to mitigate future 
breaches of fiduciary duties (Erickson, 2010). This can include a range of reforms that limit 
management's ability to entrench themselves and strengthen board oversight. Ferris et al. 
(2007), for example, show that the number of independent directors rises following the 
settlement of DLs. 
Even in situations where initiating DLs may be easier than launching securities class 
action suits, there are impediments to filing a DL. Importantly, before a DL can be filed, 
shareholders must demand that the firm's board consider the allegations being made. This 
demand requirement is based on the premise that directors must manage the affairs of firms 
and, therefore, they are best placed to determine whether there is value in proceeding with 
derivative lawsuits. However, it is common for the directors to be the actual targets of the 
lawsuit. This, consequently, reduces the chances that the board will support the filing. 
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To address such potential conflicts of interest, shareholders can present a 'demand 
futility exception' to the court by arguing that the majority of directors cannot impartially 
evaluate the lawsuit. However, the upshot of this is that it incentivizes plaintiffs to focus more 
on establishing a futility exception to file the lawsuit and effectively bypass the demand 
requirement (Swanson, 1993). As a response to a rise in lawsuits using this futility argument 
to substantiate their filings, many states progressively adopted UD laws between 1989 and 
2005 that effectively reinstated the need for shareholders to make a demand on the board, and 
that the lawsuit would only proceed if the board supports it. Appel (2019) shows that derivative 
lawsuit filings have declined by approximately a third in the states that have adopted UD laws.  
As a result of the staggered nature in which states adopted UD laws, a variation in 
derivative lawsuit risk exists not only between states, depending on whether they have adopted 
UD laws or not, but also within a state before and after it adopts a UD law. As these UD laws 
are not a result of firm-specific action, they provide a plausibly exogenous shock to shareholder 
litigation risk. Therefore, these events have been extensively used in difference-in-differences 
analysis (Bourveau et al., 2018; Ni and Yin, 2018; Nguyen et al, 2018).  
The impact of UD laws on corporate disclosure is of specific interest to our conjectures. 
Jin and Myers (2006) provide a theoretical argument that the hoarding of bad news is associated 
with stock price crash risk. While it is advantageous for managers to temporarily withhold bad 
news, if a sufficiently long pile of bad news continues to build up, managers have little option 
but to release it, usually all at once. This leads to a corresponding sharp drop in the stock price, 
resulting in long left tails in stock return distributions. Multiple studies have since provided 
empirical evidence of this (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, b; 
Callen and Fang, 2017; Kim et al., 2019).  
 For this study, it is important to understand the effect of UD laws on corporate 
disclosure. Prior studies offer mixed results. On the one hand, Boone et al. (2019) show that 
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management forecast accuracy declines when derivative lawsuit risk is reduced. Moreover, 
Appel (2019) argues that the decline in this risk leads to a greater adoption of provisions that 
entrench management, reducing the pressure for managers to release information. These 
findings suggest that a lower litigation risk may lead to greater corporate opaqueness, and 
consequently, a greater opportunity for management to hoard bad news. On the other hand, 
Bourveau et al. (2018) find that the introduction of UD laws improves corporate disclosure 
because managers’ private costs of better disclosure decline with a lower risk of being sued. 
They find that firms issue more earnings forecasts, offer richer disclosure in corporate filings 
and increase disclosures of both positive and negative news. If this is the case, we would expect 
crash risk to decline in states that have adopted UD laws due to a reduced threat of derivative 
lawsuit litigation and subsequent improvement in corporate disclosure. Because this 
relationship can go in either direction, we present our first set of testable hypotheses, H1a and 
H1b, as follows:  
H1a: The adoption of UD laws leads to a reduction in stock price crash risk. 
H1b: The adoption of UD laws leads to a rise in stock price crash risk. 
The second hypothesis focuses on the impact that the other primary form of shareholder 
litigation, namely securities class action lawsuits, can have on the relation between UD laws 
and crash risk. Even if the derivative litigation avenue becomes more challenging to pursue 
through a state's adoption of a UD law, in many cases shareholders can litigate through 
securities class action lawsuits. While securities class action lawsuits are not a perfect substitute 
to derivative lawsuits, Choi et al. (2017) note that parallel lawsuits are common. Securities 
fraud, for instance, can implicate directors and/or managers in breaching their fiduciary duties, 
which offers a ground for derivative lawsuit as well. However, Huang et al. (2019) show that 
how supportive the courts are of securities class action lawsuits has a significant impact on the 
likelihood of firms facing this type of litigation. This leads us to conjecture that if the courts 
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are less likely to entertain securities class actions, then the adoption of UD laws will likely have 
a stronger impact in reducing crash risk as both major avenues of shareholder litigation are now 
restricted to complainants. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
H2: The impact of UD laws on stock price crash risk will be stronger if the risk of 
securities class action lawsuits is less. 
Our final hypothesis focuses on the channel through which UD laws have an impact on 
crash risk. As Bourveau et al. (2018) show that corporate disclosure improves following the 
adoption of UD laws, we expect to find a link between a firm's improvement in corporate 
transparency and crash risk that is directly tied to a state's adoption of a UD law. In particular, 
Hutton et al. (2009) show that stock price crash risk is positively related to the firm’s earnings 
management, which encourages bad news hoarding. We, therefore, postulate that if UD laws 
encourage firms to engage less in earnings management, then we should find that a change in 
firm-level earnings management following a state’s adoption of UD law will lead to a reduction 
in crash risk: 
H3: Earnings management is a channel through which a state's adoption of UD law 
affects stock price crash risk.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample period begins in January 1993 and ends in January 2015. Following 
Bourveau et al. (2018), Ni and Yin (2018), and Nguyen et al (2018), we use a firm's state of 
incorporation to identify whether it is subject to a UD law. Our sample starts in 1993 as prior 
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to this date we cannot access electronic filings (via U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) Edgar) to reliably determine a firm's historical state of incorporation.3  
To construct our stock price crash risk measures, we collect daily return data for the 
common stocks of all U.S. publicly listed firms covered by the CRSP database and to which 
there is firm-level accounting information available in Compustat. I/B/E/S is used to acquire 
analyst coverage data and institutional ownership data is accessed via Thomson Reuters 13F 
filings. Following Appel (2019) and Bourveau et al. (2018), we remove firms that change their 
state of incorporation during our sample period as firms may pre-select, or even migrate to, 
states that match their preferred legal environment. This leads to our final sample consisting of 
38,471 firm-year observations from 4,738 unique firms.  
3.2 Methodology 
We utilize the three most common measures of stock price crash risk. All three 
measures are based on firm-specific returns, estimated from the residuals of the market model 
following Chen, Hong and Stein (2001). The market model we utilize is given below in 
equation (1) and is estimated on a rolling fiscal year basis: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽2,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽5,𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where ri,t is the daily stock return for firm i, ai is the intercept, rm,t is the return of CRSP value-
weighted market index and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. Following the literature, we also include two-
day lead and lag returns of the market index to allow for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 
1979). Firm-specific daily returns (Di,t), for firm i, are subsequently estimated using the 
residuals derived from equation (1). Following the crash risk literature, we log transform the 
regression residuals to address skewness: 
                                                            
3 We determine a firm’s state of incorporation based on Edgar electronic filings and from Bill McDonald’s 
website (https://sraf.nd.edu/data/).  
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𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ln�1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� (2) 
Using the firm-specific daily returns, our first measure of stock price crash risk, 
following Chen et al. (2001), is the negative skewness (NSKEW). NSKEW is calculated as 
follows: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = − �𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
3
2 ∑𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡3 �  �(𝑛𝑛 − 1)(𝑛𝑛 − 2)�∑𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 ���
3
2 (3) 
where n is the number of observations during the fiscal year t. 
Our second proxy of crash risk is down-to-up volatility (DUVOL). To estimate this 
measure, we first separate the daily returns for each firm (i) into up-day (return is above the 
annual mean for firm i) and down-day (return is below the annual mean for firm i) groups for 
each fiscal year. Next, we calculate the standard deviation for each group. DUVOL is then 
defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation in the down-day group to 
the standard deviation in the up-day group. 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = log��(𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢 − 1)∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2𝑑𝑑 �  [(𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 − 1)]∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2𝑢𝑢� � (4) 
where nu is the number of observations in the up-group, and nd is the number of observations 
in the down-group. The third measure we use is the difference in the number of times firm-
specific daily returns are above, to those that are below, k standard deviations of the mean, 
where k is set to generate frequencies of 0.01% in the log-normal distribution (Jin and Myers, 
2006). 
To examine the relation between derivative litigation risk and future stock price crash 
risk, we employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) model. Our treatment (control) group 
includes all firms that are (are not) incorporated in a state that has passed a UD law in the year 
that it is adopted. More specifically, we employ the following baseline regression in our study: 
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (5) 
where i and t represent firm and year, respectively. Our dependent variable, CRASH RISKt+1, 
represents either of our three proxies for crash risk (NSKEWt+1, DUVOLt+1 or COUNTt+1). Our 
independent variable of interest is the indicator variable UDLt. It is constructed by assigning a 
value of one to all firms incorporated in a state that has adopted a universal demand law, and 
zero otherwise.  
 In Equation (5), Xi,t is a vector of firm, industry and state controls that the prior literature 
has established as determinants of crash risk. Following Chen et al. (2001), Jin and Myers 
(2006) and Hutton et al. (2009), we control for prior period crash risk using NSKEWt; 
KURTOSISt to capture the kurtosis of firm-specific daily returns; RETURNt to represent firm-
specific daily returns; SIGMAt to measure the standard deviation of firm-specific daily returns; 
the logarithm of total assets (SIZEt); the market to book ratio (MBt); LEVERAGEt, measured as 
total long-term debt divided by total assets; ROAt, measured as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets; and share turnover (TURNOVERt).4 
In addition, as Hutton et al. (2009) note that firm-level earnings management is 
associated with bad news hoarding and, therefore, crash risk, we control for firm opacity using 
ACCRUALSt, which is estimated from the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, we control for the number of analysts following a firm (ANALYSTt) as Chen et 
al. (2001) show that analysts improve the information environment surrounding a firm and 
therefore impact future crash risk. Also, we control for product market competition using an 
industry Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), as Giroud and Mueller (2010) indicate it can act 
                                                            
4 To account for the possibility that using a lag of the dependent variable as part of the control set may bias the 
coefficient estimates (see Nickell, 1981), when NSKEWt+1 is the dependent variable we exclude its lag as a 
control variable.   
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as an external governance mechanism. For similar reasons and following the lead of Callen and 
Fang (2013, 2017), we control for institutional ownership (INSt) and auditor tenure (TENUREt). 
To control for state-level factors that may influence crash risk, we account for macro-
economic conditions within the state by including per capita income (PCIt), gross state product 
(GSPt), state-level unemployment (UEMPt), and growth in gross state product (∆GSPt). We 
obtain data for these variables from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research 
(UKCPR).5 Also, as Callen and Fang (2015) show that religious adherence of the population 
can affect crash risk, we include the number of religious adherents relative to the state's 
population (RELIGIONt). The data used to construct this religious adherence variable is 
acquired from the Association of Religion data archives.6 A description of how all the variables 
are calculated is provided in Appendix I. 
Our baseline regression model also includes firm fixed effects to account for time-
invariant omitted firm-specific factors, and year fixed effects to control for unobservable time-
variant effects. As our variable of interest, UDLt, varies by state, we cluster our standard errors 
by the state of incorporation of each firm.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Main results  
Panel A of Table 1 provides a univariate analysis of our crash risk proxies before and after 
a state adopts a UD law. We calculate the three-year average of the crash risk measures for both 
the pre- and post-UD law adoption periods and report them. The third column in the panel 
shows the difference in the values before and after the event. These statistics show a significant 
reduction in all three crash risk measures following the adoption of UD laws. NSKEWt, 
                                                            
5 UKCPR National Welfare Data, 1980-2017. URL: http://ukcpr.org/resources/national-welfare-data 
6 See http://www.thearda.com/Archive/ChCounty.asp 
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DUVOLt and COUNTt reduce by 0.162, 0.043 and 0.130, respectively. Panel B presents the 
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our baseline regressions at either the firm-year 
or state-year level. The mean for our variable of interest, UDLt, indicates that 13.6% of our 
observations are from firms incorporated in states that have adopted UD laws.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In Table 2, we present our baseline results from regressing Equation (5). In columns (1) 
to (3), the crash risk measures are regressed solely against our variable of interest, UDLt, with 
the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects. The regression models in columns (4) to (6) also 
include our complete set of control variables. Supporting H1a, the coefficients of UDLt are 
negative and significant at the 1% significance level when regressed against NSKEWt+1 and 
DUVOLt+1, and at the 5% level for COUNTt+1. To appreciate the economic significance that 
the adoption of UD laws has on crash risk, we examine the proportional reduction in crash risk 
that occurs when a state adopts a UD law relative to the dispersion of each crash risk measure. 
The results from columns (4) to (6) reveal that crash risk is reduced by 16.0%, 20.1% and 
14.4% of a standard deviation when using the NSKEWt+1, DUVOLt+1 and COUNTt+1 measures, 
respectively.7 This further reinforces the results obtained from our univariate analysis 
presented in Panel A of Table 1 when examining three-year crash risk averages, pre- and post-
UD law adoption. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We next present trend analysis for our variable of interest, UDLt. If UDLt is capturing 
a significant change in a firm's future crash risk that specifically relates to a state adopting a 
                                                            
7 These figures are based on dividing the UDLt coefficients in each regression by the standard deviation of the 
relevant crash risk measure reported in Table 1. We measure economic significance using the standard deviation 
of the crash risk variables instead of the means as they are all close to the value of zero, implying even small 
numerical changes to these values will lead to large percentage changes.    
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UD law, then we should find that if we introduce a lagged UD law indicator variable into our 
regression it should theoretically produce an insignificant coefficient result. If this is not the 
case, then it puts the validity of our baseline results into question as there would be evidence 
of a pre-treatment trend in crash risk just prior to the adoption of the UD laws. In other words, 
the DiD parallel trends assumption would be invalid. To conduct this test, we replace UDLt in 
Equation (5) with a set of new indicator variables. UDL0 is equal to the value of one during the 
year of a state's UD law adoption and UDLt-1 and UDLt-2 is equal to one for the year before 
adoption and two years before adoption, respectively. Otherwise the values are zero. We also 
include forward-looking UDL variables (UDLt+1 and UDL≥t+2). UDLt+1 is equal to one the year 
after UD law adoption, while UDL≥t+2 is equal to one for two years succeeding the adoption 
and thereafter. Otherwise, the values are again zero. Including these lead variables allows us to 
analyze the post-adoption dynamic effects.  
The results presented in Table 3 show that the lagged variables' coefficients are 
statistically insignificant, both individually and jointly, indicating that there is no evidence of 
a pre-treatment trend in crash risk before the adoption of UD laws.8 The regression results also 
show that the impact of a state adopting a UD law on a firm's crash risk is felt the year after it 
is adopted, as the coefficient estimates of UDL0 are significant in the regressions to at least the 
5% level. In addition, the impact of adopting UD laws continues to have an impact on crash 
risk in all subsequent years, with the exception being the coefficient for UDLt+1 in the COUNT 
regression.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                            
8 We do note that while the coefficient estimate for UDLt-1 in the third column of Table 3 (i.e., the COUNTt+1 
model) is insignificant, it is sizable. We, therefore, conduct a couple of robustness checks to test for the joint 
significance of the lagged coefficients to ensure the parallel trends assumption remains intact. Specifically, we 
conduct Wald restriction tests of setting the lagged UDL coefficients to zero and also Likelihood Ratio tests of 
excluding the lagged variables from the regressions. Neither of these tests show that there is joint significance in 
the lagged variables, supporting our conclusion of the absence of a pre-adoption trend. 
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Next, we conduct a placebo test to address the possibility that our prior results are 
driven by unobserved shocks that coincide with the states’ adoption of UD laws. Specifically, 
we randomly assign a firm's location to another state. If our results are driven by unobserved 
shocks that simultaneously occurred with the adoption of UD laws, we should find that when 
firms are incorrectly assigned to a state and we re-run our baseline regressions, the variable 
UDLt should continue to be significant. To strengthen the test, we repeat this experiment 1,000 
times and record the coefficient and t-statistic values for UDLt from each iteration. 
In Figure 1, we present three histograms of the t-statistics for UDLt generated from the 
placebo tests conducted for each of the three crash risk measures. For comparison, we include 
a vertical line in each histogram to represent the estimated t-statistic obtained in our baseline 
results (from columns (4) to (6) in Table 2 using the true state of incorporation data). The large 
t-statistics obtained from using the actual data are in contrast to the placebo test t-statistics that 
are rarely significant.9 This suggests that our findings are unlikely to be influenced by other 
unobserved shocks occurring at the same time as states adopt UD laws. For completeness, in 
Appendix II, we report the number of positive and the number of negative coefficients that are 
generated from the placebo runs, along with the number of those coefficients that are also 
significant at the 5% level. These statistics demonstrate an evenly distributed number of 
positive and negative coefficient values for UDLt, reinforcing the view that placebo effects are 
highly unlikely to drive our baseline results. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
As an additional test, in Table 4, we directly account for the possibility that a number 
of state-based anti-takeover provisions introduced during our sample period are interfering with 
our baseline results. These laws can entrench management and weaken the market for corporate 
                                                            
9 Only 3 out of 1,000 placebo test observations are larger than the true t-statistic for NSKEWt+1, 5 for DUVOLt+1, 
and 55 for COUNTt+1. 
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control. Changes in corporate governance practices caused by these laws can, subsequently, 
also change litigation risk. To deal with this issue, we account for the confounding law changes 
that Karpoff and Wittry (2018) discuss that have undergone a change in any of the states during 
our sample period. For each law, we determine the date it was adopted in each state and create 
an indicator variable equal to one if the law has been adopted and zero otherwise. Specifically, 
there are three laws that some states enacted during our sample period, business combination 
laws (BCL), directors' duties laws (DDL), and poison pill laws (PPL).10  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 reports regression results when each confounding law is added individually to 
the regression and also when we include all three confounding laws together. Throughout the 
twelve regressions, UDLt remains negative and significant at the 1% level when regressed 
against NSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1, while it is significant at the 5% level when regressed against 
COUNTt+1. 
4.2 Accounting for securities litigation risk 
While it is not appropriate for all cases, parallel lawsuits are not uncommon (Choi et 
al., 2017), indicating the plaintiffs' ability to switch from one form of shareholder litigation to 
another. Securities fraud tends to also implicate directors and/or managers in breaching their 
fiduciary duties, paving the way for derivative litigation. This can imply that even if a UD law 
is adopted in a state, the effect it has in reducing a firm's exposure to overall shareholder 
litigation risk may be offset by the ease with which it is possible for plaintiffs to instead launch 
a securities class action lawsuit.  
                                                            
10 The two other laws discussed in Karpoff and Wittry (2017) are control share acquisition laws and fair price 
laws. However, all states that have adopted these laws did so prior to the commencement of our sample period. 
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To address this issue, we first examine the prevalence of securities class action lawsuits 
across different states. State courts may be more or less willing to entertain securities class 
action lawsuits, which can affect the degree to which firms headquartered in that state are 
exposed to litigation of this nature, potentially moderating the impact that UD laws have on 
crash risk. We first collect securities class action data from the Audit Analytics database to 
calculate the proportion of firms that face securities class action litigation on a state-year basis. 
We then create an indicator variable, HIGH SCAt, that is equal to one if a state has a higher 
proportion than the median of any state for that year, and zero otherwise. We include this 
indicator variable in the baseline regression model as well as an interaction term with UDLt. 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 5 reveal that the coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive and significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels when NSKEWt+1, DUVOL+1 and 
COUNTt+1 are the dependent variables, respectively. Taken together, these results indicate that 
the impact of UD laws on crash risk is dampened for firms which are headquartered in states 
where securities class action is prevalent.    
Analysis by Huang et al. (2019) shows that significant variations in judge ideology exist 
across the federal circuit courts and over time. This results from the circuit court judges being 
appointed by the US president, whose choice of appointments are typically influenced by the 
president’s political affiliation. Huang et al. (2019) demonstrate that firms located in more 
liberal-leaning circuits, which tend to be more supportive of shareholders, are 33.5% more 
likely to be sued in securities class action lawsuits than those in conservative-leaning circuits. 
This implies that the risk of firms facing shareholder litigation, as a whole, may not diminish 
as much in liberal leaning circuits when UD laws are imposed relative to those located in 
conservative-leaning circuits. This will potentially moderate the impact that the adoption of 
UD laws has on crash risk.  
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To examine the impact that ex-ante securities litigation risk, proxied via circuit court 
judge ideology, has on moderating UD laws' impact in reducing crash risk, we first conduct a 
double-sort of our sample. Similar to Panel A of Table 1, we calculate the three-year averages 
for the three crash risk measures when we split our sample of firms into pre- and post- UD law 
periods. We then further split the two sub-samples into firms that are located in either 
conservative or liberal-leaning circuits. We determine whether a circuit is more conservative 
or liberal-leaning based on whether Huang et al.'s (2019) judge ideology value for a circuit is 
below or above the median value in any given year, respectively. Panel B of Table 5 reports 
the results from this double-sort and shows that the adoption of UD laws significantly reduces 
crash risk only in conservative-leaning circuits. There is a reduction in NSKEWt of 0.180, which 
is significant at the 10% level, once a state, that is associated with a conservative circuit court, 
adopts UD laws. Likewise, DUVOLt (COUNTt+1) is reduced by 0.058 (0.315), which is 
significant at the 1% level.  
In Panel C of Table 5, we show how circuit court judge ideology moderates the impact 
of UD laws in a multivariate setting. We create an indicator variable, LIBJUDGEt that equals 
one when a firm, in year t, is incorporated in a circuit that is considered liberal-leaning, and 
zero otherwise. This indicator variable is then added as an additional control and also as an 
interaction with UDLt to our baseline model. The results indicate that a firm located in a liberal-
leaning circuit significantly dampens UD laws' impact on crash risk. Comparing the interaction 
coefficient sizes with UDLt suggests that liberal-leaning courts reduce the UD law effect by at 
least a third (DUVOLt+1 being the least impacted). This supports the hypothesis that the impact 
of UD laws on crash risk will be dampened wherever alternative avenues to shareholder 
litigation exist. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Overall, the above results support H2 as they indicate that where securities class action 
lawsuits are less likely to be entertained by the courts, the impact of a state adopting a UD law 
leads to a more pronounced effect in reducing crash risk.  
4.3. Channel Analysis 
Finally, given that all our preceding analysis rests on the premise that the adoption of 
UD laws improves corporate disclosure, it is important to verify that this is true for our sample 
of firms. Following Bourveau et al. (2018), we examine three measures capturing the quantity 
of disclosure that firms release as well as two measures that capture the type/ quality of 
disclosure. Our measures of disclosure quantity are the frequency of management earnings 
forecasts, the length of the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section in 10-K 
filings, and the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings. Our first measure of disclosure quality is 
the difference between the number of times a firm releases poor management earnings forecasts 
compared to good management earnings forecasts, where forecasts are considered to be either 
good or bad based on whether they are higher or lower than analyst consensus estimates made 
before these forecasts. Our second measure of disclosure quality captures the precision of 
management earnings forecasts by measuring the width of the forecast errors (the averaged 
difference between the upper- and lower-end estimates for each year, scaled by price).  
Table 6 presents regression results showing that a firm's corporate disclosure, as 
captured by the above five measures, significantly improves following the states’ adoption of 
UD laws. Specifically, there is evidence at the 1% significance level that the frequency of 
management forecasts increases, while the width of management forecasts reduces (p < 0.05), 
and the length of MD&As plus frequency of 8-K fillings both also increase (p < 0.10). 
Moreover, the relative amount of bad to good news forecasts significantly rises, at the 1% level, 
indicating that firms are less likely hoarding bad news after the adoption of UD laws. 
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[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 7 provides a test of our third hypothesis. We postulate that as UD laws improve 
earnings transparency, crash risk will diminish. We test this in two ways.  The first method is 
based on Hutton et al. (2009) who demonstrate that stock price crash risk is directly related to 
the firm's financial reporting opacity. In particular, they focus on earnings management and 
argue that firms that engage less in earnings management are less likely to be hoarding bad 
news and therefore have reduced crash risk. Therefore, we expect the adoption of UD laws to 
encourage better disclosure practices which would reduce firms need to engage in earnings 
management and, consequently, reduce stock price crash risk. To test this, we utilize structural 
equation modelling (SEM) to consider two paths that the adoption of UD laws can have on 
crash risk. The first path is a direct route of UD laws impacting crash risk. The second path is 
a mediated route where UD laws affect the level of earnings management (as captured by our 
ACCRUALS measure) within the firm, which then subsequently affects stock price crash risk. 
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that once the indirect route is accounted for within the 
SEM, the direct route is no longer significant, implying that earnings management is the 
principal channel through which UD laws affect crash risk. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
In Panel B of Table 7, we take a different approach to consider the same issue. We 
examine firm-specific stock price crashes caused by earnings announcements that break the 
past years' strings of successive earnings increases. Prior studies argue that firms with 
consecutive strings of increasing earnings enjoy higher price premiums and a break in the string 
causes a substantial decline in the price premium (DeAngelo et al., 1996; Barth et al., 1999; 
Shanthikumar, 2012). In addition, Myers, et al. (2007) argue that strings of successive earnings 
increases are driven by earnings management, and in extreme cases, financial accounting fraud. 
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If UD laws do reduce the propensity to hoard bad news, then we should find a decline in the 
likelihood of firms experiencing stock price crashes resulting from a break in the string of 
reported consecutive earnings increases.  
In line with Andreou et al. (2017), we create three crash risk string indicator variables. 
The first is CRASH BREAK STRING 1 which is equal to one if a firm experiences a stock price 
crash and earnings have also declined in the current year but increased in the previous year. 
Otherwise the variable takes the value of zero. CRASH BREAK STRING 2 and CRASH BREAK 
STRING 3 are calculated similarly but require two and three consecutive prior years of earnings 
increases, respectively.11 We then use these three measures as dependent variables in logit 
regressions where we employ our standard set of independent variables. These results show 
that for each of the three measures, the probability of firms experiencing a crash break string 
is reduced if the state has adopted UD laws. The average marginal effect from a state adopting 
a UD law is to reduce CRASH BREAK STRING 1, 2 and 3 by 2.90%, 4.42% and 5.02%, 
respectively.    
4.4.      Robustness checks. 
In this section, we conduct a battery of robustness tests to address selection bias and to 
test the sensitivity of our results to variations in statistical and sampling design. First, we 
attempt to address selection bias using the propensity score matching (PSM) approach. 
Following Ni and Yin (2018), we construct a series of cohort firms for each UD law adoption 
event by retaining all firms with sufficient data over a seven-year window centred on the event 
date. We match each treatment firm (i.e. those firms incorporated in a state adopting a UD law 
in year t+1) within each cohort with a control firm (i.e. firms not incorporated in a state 
                                                            
11 For these three crash risk string variables, the stock price is considered to have crashed if its firm-specific 
weekly return is more than 3.09 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific return (see Andreou et al., 
2017) for either the same or subsequent year that the firm experiences negative earnings following a string of 
positive earnings increases. 
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adopting a UD law in year t+1). Propensity scores, derived in the year prior to a given state 
adopting a UD law, are based on SIZEt, LEVERAGEt, MTBt and ACCRUALSt. We repeat this 
process for each UD law cohort and then stack them together to form our final propensity score 
matched sample. Panel A of Table 8 reports balance test results, while Panel B shows 
regression results for the total six-year period surrounding the year treatment firms experience 
their state adopting UD laws. Despite this analysis using a far more constrained sample, the 
coefficients for UDLt remain significant to at least the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
   Next, we test the sensitivity of our baseline results to different model specifications 
and sampling conditions and report results in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In columns (1) to (3) in Panel A of Table 9, we report results when utilizing firm fixed 
effects and state headquarters-by-year fixed effects, and in columns (4) to (6), we show the 
results when we exclude firms incorporated in states that have adopted UD laws prior to 1995. 
Doing this ensures the availability of at least two years of observations for each firm before the 
adoption of UD laws (i.e., capturing both pre- and post-UD law periods for each state) in our 
sample. As it is common in the crash risk literature to include the lag of the dependent variable 
in the NSKEWt+1 regressions, column (7) shows the results where we include it and utilize the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) general methods of moments estimator instead of panel OLS, given 
that OLS estimates may result in bias coefficient results (Nickell, 1981).   
Panel B of Table 9 also shows that the baseline results hold when we extend our control 
variables to include several additional factors that have been shown to be impacted by the 
adoption of UD laws. This includes corporate cash holdings (Nguyen et al., 2018); executive 
compensationand corporate governance practices (Foroughi, et al., 2020). We also include two 
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state-year variables to account for the impact that a state's political ideology may have on the 
propensity that a firm faces litigation. These are state citizen ideology and state government 
ideology, as first applied by Berry et al. (1998).     
Finally, we attempt to test the sensitivity of our baseline results to the use of different 
samples designed to address the effect of the state of incorporation, corporate lobbying, and 
the financial crises. We report the results of these tests in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Panel A of Table 10 shows that our baseline results hold when we exclude the ninth 
circuit court states to deal with the possible confounding effect of the ninth circuit ruling in 
July 2nd 1999 that resulted in a more stringent interpretation of the pleading standards necessary 
to launch securities class action lawsuits (Crane and Koch, 2018). This implies that for these 
states launching a securities class action lawsuit as a possible alternative, where appropriate, to 
derivative litigation, may be more difficult than in other states. Also, given the bankruptcy 
protections offered to firms incorporated in Delaware, we show that our results hold if we 
exclude firms from that state. In Panel B of Table 10, we further show that our results hold 
when considering the possible impact that corporate lobbying may have in undermining our 
exogeneity assumption of states adopting UD laws. We follow Nguyen et al. (2018) and Appel 
(2019) in recognizing that the adoption of UD laws in Pennsylvania was a result of Supreme 
Court action in the case of Cuker v. Mikalauskas (1997) rather than due to legislative decision-
making that could be prompted by corporate lobbying. We set UDLt to equal one only for firms 
that are located in Pennsylvania after it adopted the UD law, and zero otherwise. In doing so, 
we find that our results still hold. Lastly, in Panel C of Table 10, we also show that the baseline 
results hold when we exclude the years associated with the Asian financial crisis (1997, 1998), 
the tech bubble (2000, 2001) and the global financial crisis (2007, 2008).  
 




Using the staggered adoption of universal demand laws as a plausibly exogenous shock 
to the risk of derivative litigation that firms face, we examine the impact of the reduction in 
shareholder's litigation rights on stock price crash risk. As recent research indicates that with a 
reduction in derivative lawsuit risk, corporate disclosures tend to improve (Bourveau et al., 
2018), we hypothesize that this can imply that firms are less likely to hoard bad news and 
therefore will experience a decline in stock price crash risk. Our results support this view and 
show that firms incorporated in states which have adopted universal demand laws are less likely 
to face stock price crash risk. 
 In addition, to account for the net effect of a change in shareholder litigation risk, we 
consider the impact that a firm’s exposure to securities class action lawsuits has on the 
relationship. Huang et al. (2019) find that there is variation in the amount of securities class 
action suits based on which circuit court firms are associated with. Using this variation across 
circuits, we find that the impact UD laws have in reducing crash risk is more pronounced in 
firms located in conservative-leaning circuit court jurisdictions. We also find evidence to 
support the view that earnings management is a channel by which UD laws affect stock price 
crash risk.  
 Overall, our results highlight the significant impact that shareholder litigation risk has 
on a firm's stock price crash risk and that this relationship is moderated by how favorable the 
courts are to entertaining securities class action lawsuits. This latter point suggests that, when 
examining shareholder litigation risk, future research should be mindful to consider how 
supportive the courts are likely to be of shareholder litigation. 
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Figure 1. Histograms of t-statistics from placebo tests. 
       
    
The histogram on the top left plots the distribution of the UDLt coefficient t-statistics generated from running 
1,000 iterations of our baseline regression (Equation 5) where NSKEWt+1 is the dependent variable. For each 
iteration, firms are randomly assigned to a state other than the one they are incorporated in. The vertical line 
represents the t-statistic generated from using the actual, non-randomly assigned, data. The histogram on the 
top right shows the results where the dependent variable is DUVOLt+1.  The bottom histogram shows the results 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
Panel A. Comparative Statistics  Pre UDL Post UDL Diff t-Stat P-Value 
3-year average NSKEWt  -0.047 -0.208 -0.162 2.898 0.005 
3-year average DUVOLt  -0.059 -0.102 -0.043 2.977 0.004 
3-year average COUNTt  -0.063 -0.194 -0.130 1.948 0.054 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics  Mean σ P25 Median P75 
Dependent variables       
NSKEWt+1  0.015 1.374 -0.604 -0.140 0.384 
DUVOLt+1  -0.054 0.303 -0.244 -0.072 0.111 
COUNTt+1  -0.132 1.253 -1.000 0.000 1.000 
Variable of interest       
UDLt  0.136 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm-level controls       
NSKEWt  0.020 1.297 -0.582 -0.144 0.355 
KURTOSISt  7.546 10.979 1.789 3.586 8.114 
SIGMAt  0.030 0.017 0.017 0.026 0.038 
RETURNt  -0.058 0.072 -0.071 -0.033 -0.015 
TURNOVERt  0.022 0.971 -0.291 0.008 0.310 
SIZEt  6.362 1.839 5.026 6.232 7.603 
MTBt  3.005 4.253 1.297 2.082 3.547 
LEVERAGEt  0.218 0.205 0.021 0.187 0.343 
ROAt  0.108 0.195 0.067 0.131 0.200 
ANALYSTt  2.082 0.810 1.386 2.079 2.708 
TENUREt  10.349 8.084 4.000 8.000 14.000 
HHIt  0.126 0.087 0.069 0.099 0.157 
INSt  0.665 0.283 0.448 0.704 0.934 
ACCRUALSt  0.125 0.132 0.046 0.085 0.154 
State-level controls       
PCIt  3.642 0.695 3.041 3.785 4.183 
GSPt  2.012 3.155 0.432 0.576 2.382 
UEMPt  5.237 1.767 4.000 4.700 6.400 
ΔGSPt  0.051 0.029 0.027 0.048 0.068 
RELIGIONt  0.448 0.070 0.411 0.420 0.448 
Panel A compares the three-year average crash risk measures (NSKEWt, DUVOLt and COUNTt) of firms before and 
after the state they are incorporated in adopts UD laws. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for all firm-year 
observations of the variables used in the empirical analysis. The sample consists of 38,471 firm-year observations 
from 1993 to 2014. All variables are defined in Appendix I. Continuous variables are winsorized at the one percent 
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Table 2. Baseline regression analysis. 
This table reports panel OLS regression results showing the impact that UD laws have on crash risk based on 
Equation (5). The sample consists of firm-year observations for the period 1993 to 2014. The first three columns 
are fixed effects models whereas the remaining three columns also include control variables. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
      
  NSKEWt+1  DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1   COUNTt+1 
        (1)        (2)          (3)        (4)       (5)        (6) 
UDLt -0.147*** -0.043*** -0.150** -0.220*** -0.061*** -0.181** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05)    (0.02) (0.08) 
NSKEWt     -0.025*** -0.069*** 
     (0.00) (0.01) 
KURTOSISt    -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIGMAt    -10.423*** -0.979* 2.826 
    (1.98) (0.56) (2.29) 
RETURNt    -0.014 0.382*** 2.248*** 
    (0.32) (0.08) (0.29) 
TURNOVERt    0.062*** 0.014*** 0.050*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZEt    0.161*** 0.041*** 0.126*** 
    (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
MTBt    0.020*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGEt    -0.059 -0.041*** -0.178** 
    (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) 
ROAt    0.572*** 0.144*** 0.507*** 
    (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) 
ANALYSTt    0.169*** 0.049*** 0.186*** 
    (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
TENUREt    -0.002 -0.000 0.000 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
HHIt    0.448** 0.087** 0.268 
    (0.19) (0.04) (0.17) 
INSt    0.103*** 0.022*** 0.008 
    (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) 
ACCRUALSt    0.175*** 0.033*** 0.091*** 
    (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) 
RELIGIONt    -1.035 -0.146 -0.273 
    (0.65) (0.16) (0.67) 
PCIt    0.172*** 0.052*** 0.106* 
    (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) 
GSPt    0.016** 0.003 0.001 
    (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
UEMPt    0.013 0.001 -0.010 
    (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
ΔGSPt    -0.249 -0.056 -0.114 
    (0.49) (0.11) (0.62) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471   38,471 
Adjusted R2  0.027  0.045  0.026  0.055  0.089  0.052 




Table 3. Parallel trend analysis. 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt-2       -0.051    -0.010 -0.121 
       (0.06)    (0.02) (0.16) 
UDLt-1       -0.019    -0.013 -0.305 
       (0.06)    (0.02) (0.20) 
UDLt0       -0.231**  -0.068** -0.298** 
       (0.09)    (0.03) (0.13) 
UDLt+1       -0.191*** -0.054*** -0.170 
       (0.05)    (0.02) (0.12) 
UDL≥ t+2       -0.207*** -0.063*** -0.280** 
       (0.06)    (0.02) (0.14) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  37,093 37,093      37,093 
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.102 0.072 
Wald F-stats (Coeffs. on 
UDLt-2 = UDLt-1 = 0) 
0.80 0.49 0.20 
This table reports results for when UDLt  in Equation (5) is replaced by a set of indicator variables to capture pre- 
and post-UD law adoption effects.  UDL0, UDLt-1, and UDLt-2, are equal to the value of one during the year of a 
state’s UD adoption, the year before adoption and two years before adoption, respectively, and otherwise zero. 
UDLt+1 is equal to one the year after UD law adoption while UDL≥ t+2 is equal to the value of one from two years 
and onwards following the adoption, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are 
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Table 4. Confounding law effects. 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
UDLt -0.241*** -0.217*** -0.220*** -0.242*** -0.065*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.066*** -0.193** -0.179** -0.182** -0.194** 
 (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.05)    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
BCLt 0.120***   0.145*** 0.025   0.030* 0.069   0.080 
 (0.04)      (0.05)    (0.02)   (0.02) (0.07)   (0.08) 
DDLt  -0.167***  -0.187***  -0.037**  -0.038**  -0.112  -0.095 
  (0.05)     (0.06)     (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.08) 
PPLt   -0.020    0.030      -0.013 -0.003   -0.085 -0.060 
   (0.07)    (0.05)      (0.02) (0.02)   (0.10) (0.11) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 
This table reports results when indicator variables are included in Equation (5) to account for the timing of states adopting specific state-based anti-takeover provisions. These 
provisions are business combination laws (BCLt), director’s duties laws (DDLt), and poison pill laws (PPLt). Each indicator variable is equal to one when the particular law is 
adopted within a state, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Impact from security class actions and firm ex-ante litigation risk. 
Panel A. State-based security class action intensity 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt -0.212*** -0.061*** -0.226*** 
 (0.04)    (0.01) (0.06) 
UDL x HIGH SCAt  0.073*   0.022** 0.106*** 
 (0.04)    (0.01) (0.04) 
HIGH SCAt -0.016    -0.004 -0.027 
 (0.02)    (0.00) (0.02) 
Firm and state controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.102 0.058 
Panel B. Double sort by circuit court judge ideology and UDLt 
 PRE UDL POST UDL Diff 
3-year average NSKEWt  Conservative 0.029 -0.151 -0.180* 
 Liberal -0.158 -0.187 -0.029 
3-year average DUVOLt Conservative -0.044 -0.102 -0.058*** 
 Liberal -0.074 -0.106 -0.032 
3-year average COUNTt Conservative -0.014 -0.329 -0.315*** 
 Liberal -0.158 -0.307 -0.149 
Panel C. Circuit Court Judge Ideology 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt -0.266*** -0.067*** -0.177* 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.09) 
UDLt  x LIBJUDGEt 0.124* 0.023* 0.122** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) 
LIBJUDGEt 0.018 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Firm and state Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.          35,563         35,563      35,563 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.093   0.053 
In Panel A, HIGH SCAt, is equal to one if the state has a higher proportion than the median of securities class 
action suits within any state for that year, and otherwise zero. In Panel B, firms are split based on whether they 
are located in the jurisdiction of either a conservative (LIBJUDGEt = 0) or liberal (LIBJUDGEt =1) leaning federal 
circuit court, before and after the state they are in adopts UD laws. We split circuit courts by the sample median 
of their judge ideology values obtained from Huang et al. (2019) for the period 1996-2014. The t-statistics are 
from difference in means tests. In Panel C, OLS results that controls for judge ideology are presented. Standard 
errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 







Table 6. The Impact of UD laws on Disclosure Quantity and Quality. 











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
UDLt 0.142*** 0.052* 0.054* 0.082*** -0.011** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
SIZEt 0.190*** 0.081*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.018*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
MTBt 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001** -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGEt -0.090** 0.147*** 0.110*** 0.013 -0.044*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
ROAt 0.213*** -0.063** -0.027 0.109*** -0.403*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) 
EARN VOLt -0.091*** 0.034*** -0.007 -0.012*** -0.012** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
INSt 0.176*** 0.084*** 0.167*** 0.044*** 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
RETURNt 0.572*** -0.397*** 0.052 0.251*** -0.825*** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.28) 
LOSSt -0.133*** 0.048*** 0.046*** -0.015*** -0.024** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Of Obs. 33,788 13,612 38,462 33,777 11,199 
Adjusted R2 0.619 0.840 0.788 0.190 0.726 
This table examines the impact that the adoption of UD laws has on a number of disclosure metrics. These metrics 
and accompanying regression models are calculated similarly to that presented in Bourveau, et al. (2018) and include 
the frequency of management forecasts, (column 1); the word length of the MD&A section in 10-K filings (column 
2); and the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings per year (column 3). We also calculate a measure to determine the 
difference between the number of times a firm releases good management earnings forecasts relative to bad 
management earnings forecasts, where forecasts are considered to be either good or bad based on whether they are 
higher or lower than analyst consensus estimates made prior to these forecasts (column 4); and the width of the forecast 
errors, calculated as the averaged difference between the upper- and lower-end estimates for each year, scaled by price 
(column 5). EARN VOLt represents the standard deviation of the annual return on assets of a firm over the past 10 
years while LOSSt is an indicator variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items of year t-1 is negative, 
and zero otherwise. The sample of observations differ based on data availability. Columns (1), (4) and (5) cover the 
period from 1997-2014. Column (3) is for our full sample period and column (2) is based on 1993-2006 data sourced 
from Stephen Brown’s website (https://www.stephenvbrown.com/publication/annual-mda-modifications). Standard 
errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
   




Table 7. Channel analysis through earnings management and bad news hoarding. 
Panel A. Structural Equation Modeling 
 ACCRUALSt NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indirect Effect     
UDLt -0.014***    
 (0.01)    
ACCRUALSt  0.332*** 0.051*** 0.156*** 
  (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) 
Direct Effect     
UDLt  0.015 0.008 0.025 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Firm and State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 








    (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt        -0.361***       -0.372***       -0.391*** 
                  (0.14)        (0.14)          (0.14)    
Firm and State Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.  33,615 33,559 33,519 
Pseudo R2   0.027 0.022 0.022 
In Panel A we report results from utilizing structural equation modeling to model both a direct effect that UD laws 
can have on crash risk (i.e., UDL → CRASH RISK) and a mediated (indirect) effect via earnings management (i.e., 
UDL → ACCRUALS → CRASH RISK). Panel B reports panel logit results of the impact UD laws have on the 
likelihood of bad news hoarding. Crash Break String 1 is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s earnings 
increase in the previous year but decrease in the current year and the stock price experiences a crash. Otherwise the 
variable is equal to zero. Crash Break String 2 and Crash Break String 3 are measured similarly except there must be 
two and three consecutive years of prior earnings increases, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses 
and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Robustness: Propensity score matched DiD regressions. 
Panel A. Balance test. 
  Mean Treatment cohort 
Mean 
Control cohort Diff P-Value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SIZEt  5.802 5.720 0.082 0.585 
LEVERAGEt  0.207 0.192 0.015 0.388 
MTBt  2.579 2.616 -0.037 0.874 
ACCRUALSt  0.128 0.129 -0.001 0.968 
Panel B. PSM sample regressions. 
   NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
   (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt   -0.243** -0.076*** -0.269*** 
   (0.10) (0.02) (0.10) 
Firm controls   Yes Yes Yes 
State controls   Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE   Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs.   3,753 3,753 3,753 
Adjusted R2   0.077 0.133 0.109 
Panel A reports t-tests for the differences in means between the treatment (those firms experiencing their state adopting 
UD laws) and control groups for the covariates utilized in a logistic regression to generate propensity scores that are then 
used to match each treatment firm with a control firm. Matching is based on the period before a firm experiences their 
state adopting a UD law. The caliper for matching is set to 0.05. Panel B shows results from running a regression on the 
sub-sampled data starting three years before UD law adoption to three years after. Standard errors are provided in 
parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9. Robustness: Alternative baseline regression models and additional controls. 
Panel A. Alternative baseline models 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
UDL -0.220*** -0.058*** -0.150** -0.217*** -0.061*** -0.173** -0.366** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.18) 
Firm & State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State-Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 35,681 35,681 35,681 26,191 
Adjusted R2  0.055 0.089 0.051 0.0655 0.091 0.053  
Prob > chi2       0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: Z    -30.151 [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: Z    0.765 [0.445] 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions: Prob > Chi2    0.000 
Panel B. Additional controls 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UDLt -0.345*** -0.100*** -0.278** 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.13) 
CASH_RATIOt -0.079 -0.014 -0.123 
 (0.20) (0.05) (0.13) 
CEO_CHAIRt 0.058** 0.010** 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Et 0.004 -0.001 -0.014 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
SALARYt -0.100 -0.015 -0.028 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.07) 
DELTAt -0.004 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
CIT_IDEOLOGYt -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOV_IDEOLOGYt 0.001 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Standard Firm & State Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm and Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 12,281 12,281 12,281 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.079 0.048 
In Panel A, Columns (1) to (3) reproduce our baseline regressions when using headquarter state-by-year fixed effects 
with firm fixed effects. Columns (4) to (6) restrict the sample to ensure firms in states that adopt UD laws have at least 
two years of data prior to the adoption (i.e., the states of Georgia & Michigan (1989), Florida (1990), Wisconsin (1991), 
Montana, Virginia, & Utah (1992) and New Hampshire & Missouri (1993) are dropped). Standard errors are provided 
in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. In column (7) we include the lag of the dependent variable 
(NSKEWt+1) as a control variable and use the GMM Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator, instead of panel OLS, with 
two and three lags used as the instrumental variables. P-values for the regression diagnostics are in brackets. The sample 
is reduced due to the need to create a balanced panel. Panel B reproduces the baseline results with an extended control 
set. CASH_RATIOt is cash holdings to total assets, CEO_CHAIRt is an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is 
also the chair of the board of directors and zero otherwise. Et is Bebchuck et al’s (2009) entrenchment index, SALARYt 
is the dollar value of the CEO base salary in a given fiscal year, and DELTAt is CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity 
as defined by Coles et al. (2006). CIT_IDEOLOGYt and GOV_IDEOLOGYt are state-year based measures to capture 
state citizen and state government ideology, as defined by Berry et al. (1998). Data for the first four variables are 
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extracted from ISS (formerly Riskmetrics) while data for the last two variables are from https://rcfording.com/state-
ideology-data/. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10. Additional robustness tests. 
Panel A. State Exclusions. 
 Ninth circuit states excluded Delaware Exclusion 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UDLt -0.249*** -0.067*** -0.208** -0.221*** -0.059*** -0.179** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) 
Firm & State controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 35,531 35,531 35,531 14,557 14,557 14,557 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.086 0.049 0.059 0.091 0.051 
Panel B. Corporate Lobbying Analysis. 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UDLt -0.152*** -0.046*** -0.085*** -0.178*** -0.053*** -0.102*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Firm & State controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 38,471 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.045 0.026 0.055 0.089 0.051 
Panel C. Periods of financial stress removed. 
 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 NSKEWt+1 DUVOLt+1 COUNTt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UDLt -0.154*** -0.046*** -0.143** -0.214*** -0.064*** -0.176** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.07) 
Firm & State controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 25,715 25,715 25,715 25,715 25,715 25,715 
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.026 0.018 0.039 0.064 0.039 
In Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) report regression results from Equation (5) where all firms that are within the 
jurisdiction of the ninth federal circuit court are removed from the sample. Columns (3) and (4) show regression 
results where all firms that are incorporated within the state of Delaware are excluded. In Panel B, the variable UDLt 
is set to one for firms incorporated in the state of Pennsylvania after it adopted UD laws, and zero otherwise. Panel C 
reports results from re-running the regressions when financial crisis periods are excluded (1997; 1998; 2000; 2001; 
2007; 2008). Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered by the state of incorporation. ***, ** and * 
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Appendix I. Variables definitions 
Definitions of the primary variables used in the baseline regressions are provided below. All variables are 
winsorized at the one percentile. 
Variable Name Description 
  
Shareholder litigation rights  
UDLt Indicator variable set to one if a firm’s state of incorporation has adopted 
a universal demand law, and zero otherwise. 
Stock Price Crash Risk 
Variables 
 
NSKEWt+1 Negative coefficient of skewness of daily firm-specific stock returns 
during the fiscal year t+1. See equation (3). 
DUVOLt+1 Natural log of down to up volatility of daily firm-specific stock returns 
measured over the fiscal year t+1. See equation (4). 
COUNTt+1 The difference in the number of times firm-specific daily returns are 
above, to those that are below, k standard deviations of the mean, where 
k is set to generate frequencies of 0.01% in the log-normal distribution. 
Other Variables  
ACCRUALSt Three year rolling sum of absolute abnormal accruals as estimated from 
the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). 
ANALYSTt The logarithm of the number of analysts covering a firm in fiscal year. 
GSPt Annual gross state product in $100 billions. 
ΔGSPt 3-year average growth rate in gross state product. 
HHIt Industry concentration measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
INSt Proportion of the firm owned by institutional investors. 
KURTOSISt Kurtosis of daily firm-specific stock returns over the fiscal year. 
LEVERAGEt Total long-term debt to total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
MTBt Market to book value of equity at end of fiscal year. 
PCIt Annual per capita income ($’000s). 
RELIGIONt Proportion of religious adherents in a state relative to the population. 
RETURNt Average daily return of firm-specific stock returns over the fiscal year. 
ROAt Income before extraordinary items over total assets at end of fiscal year. 
SIGMAt Standard deviation of firm-specific stock returns over the fiscal year. 
SIZEt Natural logarithm of total assets at end of fiscal year. 
TENUREt Tenure of a firm’s auditor, measured in years. 
TURNOVERt Average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year t minus average 
monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal year (t-1). Monthly share 
turnover is defined as monthly share trading volume scaled by total 
number of shares outstanding for the month. 
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Appendix II. Summary statistics of the placebo tests. 
This appendix reports the distribution of the coefficients for UDLt generated from 1,000 placebo regressions. 
The number of coefficients that are either negative or positive are reported along with the number of positive 
and negative coefficients that are also significant at the 5% level. 
NSKEWt+1       
  Observations Mean Median 
Full sample coefficient distribution    
Positive coefficients 513 0.063 0.052 
Negative coefficients 487 -0.065 -0.055 
    
Significant coefficients at the 5% level    
Positive coefficients 91 0.133 0.133 
Negative coefficients 86 -0.141 -0.133 
        
DUVOLt+1       
  Observations Mean Median 
Full sample coefficient distribution    
Positive coefficients 496 0.014 0.012 
Negative coefficients 504 -0.014 -0.012 
    
Significant coefficients at the 5% level    
Positive coefficients 32 0.036 0.034 
Negative coefficients 29 -0.036 -0.034 
 
COUNTt+1       
  Observations Mean Median 
Full sample coefficient distribution    
Positive coefficients 491 0.062 0.054 
Negative coefficients 509 -0.063 -0.052 
    
Significant coefficients at the 5% level    
Positive coefficients 35 0.158 0.156 
Negative coefficients 38 -0.158 -0.146 
        
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3832156
